Website Security Statistics 2026: 416 Newly Launched Sites Scanned

We ran a passive security check on 416 newly launched websites — security headers, SSL certificates, DNS records and email spoofing protection. 71.6% ship no Content-Security-Policy. 66% can be impersonated by email. 82.5% have no DNSSEC. And not one of them had a critical vulnerability.
The story people expect about vibe-coded apps is that they are catastrophes. The data says something less dramatic and more useful: they are not broken, they are unhardened, and they are unhardened in exactly the same places as each other.
- 416
- sites scanned, July–August 2026
- 76.8
- average security score out of 100
- 0
- sites with a critical issue
- 13.5%
- ship a real Content-Security-Policy
How we scanned 416 newly launched websites
Every site here is a product someone shipped recently — mostly public launches, plus people who ran our free scanner on their own site. Each domain appears once, using its most recent completed scan.
The check is entirely passive. We read the TLS certificate, the HTTP response headers, cookie flags, public DNS records and public certificate transparency logs. No logins, no forms, no requesting paths an ordinary visitor would not.
Average website security score: 76.8 out of 100
The mean score was 76.8 and the median 78. The lowest site scored 52; four scored a perfect 100. The distribution is a fat middle with no long tail of disasters.
The average site carries 5.4 findings. Almost every one of them is a header that was never set or a DNS record that was never added — not a mistake anyone made, just a step nobody knew was theirs.
The most common website security issues in 2026
Every finding below is free to fix and takes minutes. None of them require changing your application logic.
| Finding | Share of sites | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|
| No CAA records | 82.5% | info | |
| DNSSEC not enabled | 82.5% | info | |
| No Content-Security-Policy | 71.6% | warning | |
| Clickjacking not blocked | 57.2% | warning | |
| No X-Content-Type-Options | 45.9% | info | |
| No DMARC record | 37.0% | warning | |
| No HSTS header | 35.1% | warning | |
| DMARC set to monitor-only | 29.3% | info | |
| No SPF record | 25.2% | warning | |
| Server software version disclosed | 21.4% | info | |
| Weak Content-Security-Policy | 13.9% | info | |
| Cookies readable by JavaScript | 9.6% | info | |
| HTTP not redirected to HTTPS | 7.5% | warning | |
| Cookies set without the Secure flag | 7.0% | warning | |
| Insecure content on a secure page | 1.2% | warning |
DMARC adoption: 66% of sites can be email-spoofed
DMARC is the DNS record that tells the world's inboxes what to do with mail claiming to come from your domain. Without it, anyone can send email as [email protected] and it arrives looking real.
37% publish no DMARC record at all. Another 29.3% publish one set to p=none, which reports the forgery to you and delivers it anyway. Taken together, 66% of these products can be impersonated by email, or will only find out after the fact.
A quarter have no SPF record either, and 18.8% have neither. For a product that sends password resets and receipts, that is the difference between a phishing attempt bouncing and a phishing attempt landing.
Custom domain vs platform subdomain: which is more secure?
Sites still on their hosting platform's own subdomain scored better than sites on a domain their owner bought.
| Where it's hosted | Sites | Mean score | Graded A or B |
|---|---|---|---|
vercel.app | 13 | 85.2 | 92% |
netlify.app | 7 | 84.0 | 100% |
github.io | 6 | 81.7 | 83% |
| A domain they bought | 386 | 76.3 | 56% |
The mechanism is not mysterious. A platform subdomain arrives with HTTPS enforced, HSTS set, and DNS you never touch — the platform did the boring parts because the platform owns the domain.
Point your own domain at the same deployment and you silently inherit all of it. Nothing warns you. The deploy still succeeds, the site still loads, and a checklist you never saw goes unticked.
Exposed staging and admin subdomains: 22 of 416 sites
Certificate transparency logs are public. Every TLS certificate ever issued for your domain is listed in them, including certificates for subdomains you assumed were private.
22 of the 416 sites have subdomains discoverable this way that look like they were not meant to be found: 18 staging environments, 9 admin panels, 8 development servers, plus test boxes, old versions and a hosting control panel. One site exposes sixteen — its staging environment is a complete parallel copy of the product, mail server included.
We have named nobody and touched none of those hosts. We only read the public certificate log. Anyone else reading the same log gets the same list, which is the point.
How to fix the most common website security issues
In order of what they buy you per minute spent. None require a rewrite, a dependency, or a vendor.
1. How to add a DMARC record to stop email spoofing
One DNS TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. Start at p=none to watch what is being sent, then move to p=reject once your legitimate mail passes. This is the most skipped item on the list and the one with a named victim when it goes wrong.
2. How to add Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options and HSTS headers
Roughly 70% of these sites ship none of the three. In Next.js it is a few lines in next.config; on Netlify or Cloudflare it is a config file. We walk through it in how to add security headers in Next.js, and what security headers actually do covers each one in plain English.
3. How to find exposed subdomains in certificate transparency logs
Search your own domain in a certificate transparency log and read what comes back. If a staging, admin or development host is listed, put authentication in front of it or take it off the public internet.
4. How to add a CAA record to restrict certificate issuance
Two minutes, and it stops any certificate authority except the one you name from issuing a certificate for your domain. 82.5% of these sites do not have one.
All four are on the website launch security checklist, alongside the rest of what to check before you ship.
How this website security data was collected
416 distinct domains, each scanned between 12 July and 19 August 2026. Where a site was scanned more than once, only the most recent result counts. Domains that asked to be removed are excluded entirely.
Limitations of this website security sample
This is newly launched indie software, weighted toward products posted somewhere public. It is not the web, not enterprise software, and not a random sample of anything. Read every percentage as “among recently launched indie products”, never as “among websites”.
Individual sites are never named here. Every report is public at our report directory, and any owner can remove theirs without an account.
Where does your site land?
The same check, free, on any site you own. About a minute, no signup, and every finding comes with the exact change to make. Then we keep watching it — SSL that lapses, a page that goes down, a header that disappears in a deploy.
spot something wrong or out of date? [email protected] — we'll fix it